The California Supreme Court granted review of Riley 

Fighting for property owner’s view rights!

On September 18, 2024, the California Supreme Court granted Turner Law’s petition for review in Cohen vs. Superior Court (Schwartz): “The issue to be briefed and argued is limited to the following: “Does Government Code section 36900, subdivision (a) confer upon private citizens a right to redress violations of municipal ordinances?” That statute provides in part: “The violation of a city ordinance may be prosecuted by city authorities in the name of the people of the State of California, or redressed by civil action.” (emphasis added)

In other words, at issue are property owners’ fundamental right to file a civil action to seek enforcement of a local building or zoning code ordinance that is intended to relate to view protection.

Please CLICK HERE to contact us if you want further information.

Uninvestigated Violations: The fundamental concern here is the City of Los Angeles’s limited and seemingly selective enforcement of fence and hedge height violations, which raises significant questions about equity and fairness in urban governance. Many residents have expressed frustrations, feeling that certain neighborhoods are scrutinized more closely than others, leading to a perception of bias in the enforcement process. The City of Los Angeles’s position is that citizens do not have the right to seek redress for code violations, leaving many individuals feeling powerless against the arbitrary application of these rules. Furthermore, this situation can create negative ramifications for community harmony, as residents may feel they are at the mercy of an inconsistent regulatory framework. For those interested in deeper legal implications, click here to review the City’s “Amicus” brief that it filed in the Court of Appeal to better understand the official stance and the arguments being made regarding these pressing issues.

BACKGROUND

The Turner Law is often asked by property owners for legal help when a neighbor is violating a building or zoning code provision related to view protection, such as a local fence or hedge height ordinance. These violations can be particularly frustrating, as they not only obstruct scenic views but can also impact property values and the overall enjoyment of one’s home. Many cities and towns in California recognize the importance of preserving views and limit the height of fences and hedges in residential areas to six feet. This regulation aims to maintain a sense of openness and aesthetic appeal in neighborhoods, ensuring that homeowners can enjoy their beautiful surroundings without excessive obstruction. In addition to legal advice, the View Rights Center assists residents in navigating the complexities of local ordinances, empowering them to enforce their rights effectively while fostering goodwill and cooperation with neighbors.

In 2002, the Second District Court of Appeal in Riley v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 100 Cal. App. 4th held that Government Code section 36900 allows a private party to sue for redress for violation of a Municipal Code.

Using 36900 to enforce hedge and fence height law (Riley)

For instance, based on Riley a homeowner in Morro Bay brought a civil action because the City refused to enforce its hedge height law, because the City deemed the Myoporum to be trees, not hedges, and that “‘the code [section limiting the height of hedges] doesn’t limit the height of trees.'” Kraus v. Grilli (Cal. Ct. App., 2015) The neighbor had replaced eucalyptus trees with a row of five or six “fast-growing” Myoporum laetum shrubs (Myoporum) that were planted along the boundary. By the time of trial, the Myoporum had grown to a height of approximately 23 feet
and a length of approximately 50 feet. The plants blocked sunlight and respondent’s
ocean views.

During the trial, the judge visited the parties’ residences and viewed the Myoporum. The judge determined based the nature, size, location, and purpose, the Myoporum constitutes a hedge and fence within the meaning of the Morro Bay Municipal Code.” The court determined that the hedge was a private nuisance and was in violation of the municipal code’s height limit of six feet, six inches. The judgment ordered a “permanent mandatory injunction requiring the neighbor or any other successive owner to “either remove the hedge in its entirety or remove “at least 5 feet of the mature canopy per year . . . to a maximum height not to exceed six feet, six inches.”

On appeal, the neighbor argued that the property owner did not have standing to enforce compliance with the height ordinance. The neighbor argued: “This Court should reverse the trial court to discourage officious private citizens from using
their neighbors to enforce local ordinances. If [as here] the ordinance is silent on standing, enforcement is best left to the city that created the ordinance and can best show meaningful restraint in resolving disputes as the City of Morro Bay did here.” “If an ordinance should be privately enforced, that right should be conferred by the city that authorizes the ordinance, not seized by private citizens with the resources to hire lawyers.”

The Court of Appeal rejected that argument based on Riley, stating: “Respondent had standing to enforce the ordinance. Government Code section 36900, subdivision (a), provides: “The violation of a city ordinance may be prosecuted by city authorities in the name of the people of the State of California, or redressed by civil action.” This section “expressly permits violations of city ordinances to be ‘redressed by civil action.’ … [Appellant] refer[s] us to no state law that allows a city to abrogate the right of redress created in the Government Code. We decline to read into the Municipal Code an intent to create an impermissible conflict with state law by abrogating the right to a civil action created by the Government Code.” (Riley v. Hilton Hotels Corp. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 599, 607.) Thus, the Court of Appeal affirmed the decision in an unpublished decision.

Based on Riley and Krauss, many civil actions have been filed to enforce local hedge and fence height regulations, as well as other important land use laws. These legal disputes often arise when property owners believe that their neighbors are not adhering to established height restrictions or are otherwise misusing their land in ways that infringe upon the enjoyment and value of adjacent properties. The local governing bodies often do not have the resources to investigate and enforce these laws, leading to a backlog of complaints that remain unaddressed for extended periods. Moreover, local officials often do not want to get involved in neighbor disputes. Sometimes it seems that favoritism is being used. This often results in residents feeling frustrated and powerless while their neighbor violates the law. If local officials do not have the resources or wherewithal to enforce their own laws, property owners should be able to seek redress through civil action.

Schwartz vs. Cohen

Homeowners in Brentwood had asked their neighbor to trim his hedges that were blocking their view. When he refused, the homeowners filed a code enforcement complaint with the City. Because the City had not even started its investigation, the homeowners filed a civil action. Because the trial court overruled (denied) the defendants’ demurrer, the defendant retained one of the most well known appellate specialists to file a writ, which Second Appellate District granted on June 5, 2024, Cohen et al. v. Superior Court Los Angeles County et al., (Case: B330202). The Court of Appeal certified its opinion for publication. The court concluded “the doctrine of stare decisis does not prevent us from reexamining and disagreeing with Riley. Thus, we overrule Riley and disavow its recognition of a private right of action by members of the general public under section 36900, subdivision (a). We therefore will issue a peremptory writ of mandate as requested by the Cohens.” To be clear, we hold only that section 36900 does not authorize private parties to bring civil suits to enforce local ordinances. We do not disturb caselaw recognizing that, in some instances, a defendant’s violation of a local ordinance may be relevant to, or provide an element of, some other cause of action by a private party, such as nuisance or public nuisance.”

Supreme Court Review

Attorneys affiliated with the View Rights Center filed a petition for Supreme Court Review. Other attorneys filed amicus briefs.

On September 18, 2024, the California Supreme Court granted the petition as follows:

The petition for review is granted.

Pending review, the opinion of the Court of Appeal, which is currently published at 102 Cal.App.5th 706, may be cited, not only for its persuasive value, but also for the limited purpose of establishing the existence of a conflict in authority that would in turn allow trial courts to exercise discretion under Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 456, to choose between sides of any such conflict. (See Standing Order Exercising Authority Under California Rules of Court, Rule 8.1115(e)(3), Upon Grant of Review or Transfer of a Matter with an Underlying Published Court of Appeal Opinion, Administrative Order 2021-04-21; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(e)(3) and corresponding Comment, par. 2.)

The issue to be briefed and argued is limited to the following: Does Government Code section 36900, subdivision (a) confer upon private citizens a right to redress violations of municipal ordinances?

Votes: Guerrero, C. J., Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins and Evans, JJ.

Under Supreme Court Rules, the opening brief is currently due by October 18, 2024. This timeline is crucial, as it sets the stage for the case to unfold in the legal system. An important legal right to seek “redress” by civil action is at stake, which plays a pivotal role in ensuring that individuals and entities have the opportunity to address grievances and seek justice. Without that right, property owners’ rights are severely limited, restricting their ability to challenge injustices or unlawful actions against their property. Therefore, taking timely action is essential.

Please CLICK HERE to contact us if you want further information, as we are ready to assist you in navigating these complex legal challenges and ensuring that your voice is heard.

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City of Los Angeles “Amicus” Briefs against Riley 

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Fence, Tree, and Hedge Height Law

By Keith Turner and Justin Escano

Fence, Tree, and Hedge Height Law

  1. Is property subject to CCRs or other recorded property specific restrictions?
  2. Local Zoning – local Municipal Code provisions
  3. Spite fence law

  1. Is property subject to CCRs or other recorded property specific restrictions?

First, obtain a title report.  Many properties, such as large areas north of Sunset Blvd. in Pacific Palisades, are subject to recorded CC&Rs (conditions, covenants, and restrictions), DORs (declarations of restriction) or similar recorded restrictions which limit heights of fences, trees, etc.  For instance, some of the Marquez Knolls CC&Rs limits boundary fences and walls to a height of three feet.   (Tract 2622, ¶14)

  1. Local zoning – Municipal Code provisions

Many residential properties in California are subject to local fence, wall and hedge height ordinances, which often limit the height to six (6) or eight (8) feet in height.  These zoning law often defines the terms “fence” and “wall” to include: latticework, ornamental fences, screen walls, hedges or thick growths of shrubs or trees.

For instance,  Los Angeles Municipal Code §12 22.C.20.(f) provides: 

  • FRONT YARD FENCES: in most residential areas, fences, hedges, trees are limited to 3.5′ in height in the front yard.
  • SIDE YARDS, REAR YARDS AND OTHER SPACES: 6′ or 8′ depending on property’s zoning. For example:
    • 8 ft. maximum height – R zoned property, if lot width is 40 ft. or greater and not in hillside area.
    • 6 ft. maximum height – R zone if lot width is less 40 ft
    • 6 ft. maximum height – R zone, hillside area.

See LAMC §12.22.C.20.(f)(3) for full text of law and height limits in other property zones (which is below).

How measured?

  • The Ordinance states: “Fence and wall height shall be measured from the natural ground level adjacent thereto.”
  • BUT see LADBS, INFORMATION BULLETIN / PUBLIC – ZONING CODE

screenshot

  1. Spite Fence Law

What is a spite fence?

California spite fence law starts with Civil Code section 841.4. It states, “any fence or other structure in the nature of a fence unnecessarily exceeding 10 feet in height maliciously erected or maintained for the purpose of annoying the owner or occupant of adjoining property is a private nuisance.” The statute is not limited to traditional fences. In Wilson v. Handley (2002) 97 Cal.App.3d 1301, the Court of Appeals held that trees and hedges planted in a row to form a barrier may be deemed a spite fence. The court agreed in Vanderpol v. Star (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 385, finding that at row of pine trees planted along a neighbor’s boundary line could be considered a spite fence for the purposes of the statute.

The court in Wilson v. Handley expanded the definition of a “structure in the nature of a fence.” Defendants argued that a row of trees was a not a “structure”, and thus could not come under Section 841.4. The court, however, defined a fence as  a “structure … erected … to separate two contiguous estates,” and “a barrier intended … to mark a boundary.” Ultimately, the court concluded that, in light of the purpose of the spite fence statute, the term “fence” should be liberally construed. By this reasoning, other non-traditional fence-like structures may come under the California spite fence statute.

The Los Angeles Municipal Code has its own spite fence statute. LAMC Section 41.30 states, “”No person shall maliciously construct, erect, build, plant, cultivate or maintain any fence or wall or any hedge or similar growth unnecessarily exceeding six (6) feet in height, for the purpose of annoying the owners or occupants of adjoining property.”

NEXT STEPS

Keith Turner/the Turner Law Firm has handled hundreds of fence, wall, hedge and tree height disputes.  If you are interested in pursuing a claim or have to retain counsel to defend against a claim, please contact mm@turner.law to request an initial consultation.

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6/21/19 COURT OF APPEAL GUTTED VIEW RIGHTS PROVIDED BY THE MARQUEZ KNOLLS CC&Rs

UPDATE 2.9.23: Since the Court of Appeal’s decision in June 2019, there have been new cases interpreting the Court’s analysis. More information here: Post-Eisen Cases


UPDATE 9.12.19: The Supreme Court has denied the Petition for Review and Request for Depublication. More information on the Supreme Court case can be found on the Court of Appeal website.


UPDATE 8.10.19: The Eisen’s and Marquez Knolls Property Owners Association, Inc. are seeking to have the California Supreme Court grant review, which it does in less than 5% of the cases. Nonetheless, affected and interested property owners should support the fight with their own “amicus” letter to the Court” Marquez Knolls Property Owners Association 8/9/19 Amicus Letter


The Court of Appeal just gutted the Marquez Knolls CC&Rs.  Eisen v. Tavangarian – filed June 20, 2019, Second District, Div. Seven , full text click here.

Paragraph 11 of Marquez Knolls CC&Rs provides:

“No fences or hedges exceeding three feet in height shall be erected or permitted to remain between the street and the front set-back line nor shall any tree, shrub or other landscaping be planted or any structures erected that may at present or in the future obstruct the view from any other lot, and the right of entry is reserved by the Declarants to trim any tree obstructing the view of any lot.”

The Court of Appeal framed the issue as: “Does paragraph 11 of the CC&R’s … apply to alterations or renovations to existing homes?”

To summarize the 34 page decision, the Court specifically held: “Paragraph 11 does not restrict renovating or altering existing residences.” But the Court also held that the “Portion of the Judgment Requiring the Street-facing Hedges To Be Trimmed to a Height of Three Feet or Under Is Affirmed.”

So Paragraph 11 applies to trees but not additions or structures?

COMMENT: The decision does not make sense. If trees cannot obstruct a view, does it make sense that buildings can? Hundreds of homeowners have relied on Paragraph 11 ‘s clear intent to protect their views.

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8/1/19: Infamous Rustic Canyon house finally demolished after 17 years of litigation

In 1998, a property owner (Mehr Beglari) pulled permits for a remodel of an existing home in the Rustic Canyon area of Pacific Palisades. Five neighbors complained to the Los Angeles Department of Building and Safety (LADBS), alleging that the house exceeded a height of 36 feet from grade; the front yard depth was not properly measured; and that a yard variance granted in 1955 precluded the remodel design. The five neighbors included two Superior Court Judges and a prominant attorney. When the LADBS concluded that the Beglaris’ permits were properly issued, the neighbors appealed the case to the Department of City Planning, which sided with the LADBS.

The neighbors persevered. In 2002, they filed suit in Los Angeles Superior Court to challenge the ruling by the Department of City Planning. They dropped two of their complaints, targeting only on the front-yard setback issue. (click here to read the Complaint and other court documents.) In October 2003, the trial court ruled in favor of the neighbors, and ordered the City to revoke all of the building permits for the structure, including the certificate of occupancy. The Beglaries and the City of Los Angeles subsequently appealed.

The writ was affirmed by the court of appeal. Horwitz v. City of Angeles (2004) 124 Cal. App. 4th 1344. The court that then newly-remodeled house encroached onto the front-yard setback by 14 feet, in violation of Los Angeles Municipal Code section 12.07.01.C.1.

After the Court of Appeal decision, the City revoked all building permits and the certificate of occupancy for 909 Greentree, leaving the Belgaris with an un-permitted home. However, the Belgaris did not sit idly by; instead, they hatched a plan to get their permits back. In 2004, they purchased another property, right down the street, at 921 Greentree Road. Then, they obtained a permit for and constructed a small canopy on  the front of 921 Greentree. The new canopy changed the front-yard setback calculation for the entire block, including for their house at 909 Greentree.

Based on this altered front-yard setback calculation, the Belgaris’ home  at 909 Greentree satisfied the LAMC requirements. In February 2006, the City reinstated the building permits and certificate of occupancy for 909 Greentree.

The neighbors responded by filing another lawsuit, this time against the City of Los Angeles and the LADBS general manager, for reissuing the permits in violation of the court’s prior order. The superior court issued an order finding that the City and the Department of Building and Safety were in contempt for violation of that order, and ordered them to appear for appear at an arraignment and trial setting.

However, the case never got to trial. Instead, in February 2007, the City Council approved a $425,000 settlement for the five neighbor-plaintiffs.  The Belgaris’ attorney asked the City not to settle, accusing the neighbors of “intimidating and bullying the City” into paying into paying what amounts to blood money.” Nonetheless, due to the high potential damages exposure and potential criminal contempt proceedings, the City Attorney recommended that the City settle the dispute by paying the plaintiffs’ attorney fees, which at the time totaled $425,000.

The litigation between the City and Belgaris continued until 2013, with at least two more trips to the Court of Appeal in 2009 and 2013. Apparently the litigaiton ended in 2013.

According to public records, it appears that the Belgaris lost the home to foreclosure in 2016. In 2018, the new owner sought a demolition permit, and according to Nextdoor website, as of July 31, 2019, the structure was finally being demolised.

To the author, the question is whether the result would have been different if the complaining neighbors had directly sued the property based on Gov’t Code section 36900 instead of proceeding by writ action against the City?

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Horowitz/Belgari case documents

Below is a collection of documents from the infamous Horotiwz and Belgari cases which have resulted in the demolition of the residence at 909 Greentree Road in the Rustic Canyon area of Pacific Palisades.

2002 Complaint Horwitz vs. City of L.A. Download

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(THIS POST HAS BEE UPDATED.) Marquez Knolls’ view rights under attack again (Eisen vs. Tavangarian)

THIS POST HAS BEEN UPDATED IN LIGHT OF THE 6/20/19 COURT OF APPEAL DECISON.  CLICK HERE

Marquez Knolls’ view rights under attack again (Eisen vs. Tavangarian)

Since the 1950s, property owners in the Marquez Knolls tracts in Pacific Palisades have relied on the recorded CC&Rs to protect their views.  Although the original architectural committee’s powers expired on December 31, 1995, many property owners believed that their view rights continued by CC&Rs Paragraph 11, which did not have a termination date, and which provides:

“No fences or hedges exceeding three feet in height shall be erected or permitted to remain between the street and the front set-back line nor shall any tree, shrub or other landscaping be planted or any structures erected that may at present or in the future unreasonably obstruct the view from any other lot, and the right of entry is reserved by the Declarants to trim any tree obstructing the view of any lot.”

(The word “unreasonably” was added to ¶11 by the Court of Appeal in its 2005 decision in Zabrucky v. McAdams (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 618.)

For the reasons discussed below, it could now be the perfect storm to reverse or materially change the view rights that were provided in Zabrucky.

There is a case currently on appeal that is seeking to reverse or limit the view rights the court affirmed in the 2005 Zabrucky case.  The current case is Eisen vs. Tavangarian  (See opening brief served on Sept. 25, 2017.)   Concerned Marquez Knolls’ property owners can voice their concern by submitting an amicus brief by the court deadline.  (Contact us for information on the deadline.)

The plaintiffs in Eisen sued a well known local developer for obstructing their view.  The trial judge found in favor of the plaintiffs and ordered the defendant to remove a portion of the new “spec” house he had constructed.   The defendant is presently appealing the judgment against him, and in his opening appellate brief is seeking to the view rights it affirmed in the Zabrucky case

The plaintiffs in Zabrucky had actually argued that ¶11 precluded any obstruction of their ocean view.  The Court of Appeal in that case was apparently aware that its decision would have a significant impact on the ability to remodel the original aging homes in Marquez Knolls.  The court tried to find a balance, while acknowledging the CC&Rs’ intent to provide view rights.  As the court stated at pages 623-624:

“In common with most coastline housing in Southern California, the prime thing the Marquez Knolls development sold its prospective homeowners was a beautiful ocean view. In fact, like most such housing, much of the value of any property within the development depends on the quality of the view. To significantly obstruct any homeowner’s view of the Pacific Ocean is to depreciate the economic worth of their property-often by several hundred thousand dollars – as well as dramatically reduce their enjoyment of the home they bought and live in. Thus, it is not surprising the rest of the Zabruckys’ neighbors, the MKPOA, filed an amicus brief seeking to enforce the development’s CC&Rs. These provisions, and especially the Paragraph 11 at issue in this case, form their only bulwark against rampant expansions of existing residences that would obstruct views and depreciate land values throughout the entire Marquez Knolls neighborhood.”

The plaintiffs argued that ¶11 prohibited any obstruction.  But the court of appeal in the published decision rejected that argument and instead added the word “unreasonably” to ¶11”.  At page 629 the Court stated:

“However, it is not reasonable to interpret the CC&Rs as prohibiting any obstruction of existing views as urged by appellants. We agree with the trial court’s observation that it would have been impractical for the original drafters of the CC&Rs to have intended that no house be built which obstructed any other owner’s view. Thus, we conclude it would be in keeping with the intent of the drafters of the CC&Rs to read into Paragraph 11 a provision that the view may not be unreasonably obstructed, thus the sentence would read, “may at present or in the future unreasonably obstruct the view from any other lot.” (Change underlined.)”

Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, on re-trial, the trial court judge inspected the properties and decided that defendants’ remodeling project was not an unreasonable obstruction.  (See then Judge John L. Segal’s Statement of Decision 3-1-2006.)

Since 2005, there have been a number of lawsuits filed challenging new construction and remodeling projects and also landscaping on the grounds that the construction or landscaping was or would be an unreasonable obstruction.  (See partial list of case here.)  The many of those cases went to trial and were decided by a judge, not a jury, and it seems the result depended on the particular’s judge’s interpretation of what constitutes to be “unreasonable obstruction.”

The trial judge for the Zabrucky re-trial is now one of the three appellate justices that is deciding the Eisen appeal.  In Zabrucky and supposedly in the other Marquez Knolls cases he decided as a trial court judge, Judge (now Justice) Segal did not find for any plaintiff seeking to enforce ¶11.

But the main concern now is that the Presiding Justice for the Eisen appeal, Justice Dennis M. Perluss, wrote the dissenting opinion in Zabrucky.  In Zabrucky, Justice Perluss disagreed with the majority’s interpretation of paragraph 11, explaining that its “plain language . . . particularly when considered together with other provisions in the CC&R’s,” did not support the majority’s conclusion. (Zabrucky, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 630 (dis. opn. of Perluss, J.).)

“Apparently uncomfortable with the harsh consequences of their restrictive reading of the view protection clause, my colleagues adopt the suggestion advanced by amicus curiae Marquez Knolls Property Owners Association (but notably not endorsed by the Zabruckys) and create a reasonableness limitation on the absolute prohibition of view obstruction contained in paragraph 11. This effort to mitigate the impact of their decision for homeowners like McAdams and Baines who may wish to renovate homes that are now 40 years old is in many respects commendable, but it constitutes an impermissible rewriting of the express terms of the CC & R’s.”

“The majority’s legitimate concern that paragraph 11 may be applied unreasonably suggests to me it has misinterpreted that provision. Its apprehension, however, is not a justification for a judicial rewriting of the parties’ agreement.”

But more problematic is that Judge Perluss’s dissent in Zabrucky went further by concluding that ¶11 should not even apply to structures:

“Although in other contexts the word ‘structure’ may include the residence itself, given the apparent object of paragraph 11, particularly when read together with paragraph 2, ‘structures’ in this paragraph is properly limited to landscaping or other outdoor items separated from the residence itself—gazebos, trellises, carriage or pool houses.”

The Appellant (Ardie Tavangarian) in Eisen is arguing among other things that “Paragraph 11 applies only to landscaping structures and therefore does not restrict alterations to a residence.“  (Opening Brief, p. 35)  With Justices Perluss and Segal as the appellate justices, it seems from the sidelines that the view rights that many have taken for granted in Marquez Knolls could be eliminated or severely limited by the Court’s decision in Eisen.  

NEWS:   The case was fully briefed as of September 10, 2018, but a group of homeowners, led by the usual suspects, Judith A. Gelfand and Wayne Marcus, sought and obtained permission to file an amicus brief (friends of the court).  The editor of this blog has asked for copies of those briefs.  At this point we assume the the oral argument will be scheduled for late winter or so.  

To get updates about the case directly from the Court of Appeal, CLICK HERE and enter the COA case number: B278271.

10/12/2018 Amicus curiae brief filed by: Amicus curiae for appellant: Marquez Knolls Homeowners et al.
Attorney: Judith A. Gelfand Marquez Knolls Homeowners Judith A. Gelfand, Wayne Marcus, Bernard Hathaway, William R. Fado, H. Peter Grassl, Kathleen A. Kerrigan, Silgia Grassl, Emil Kadrnka, Simon T. Halff, Brian Faris, Peter J. Zomber, Sabrina Diaz and Renate Hecht in support of plaintiffs Glenn Eisen and Alison Eisen.
11/01/2018 Response to amicus curiae brief filed by: Defendant and Appellant: Ardeshir Tavangarian
Attorney: Faryan Andrew Afifi 
Defendant and Appellant: Tania Tavangarian
Attorney: Faryan Andrew Afifi 
Defendant and Appellant: 619 Properties, LLC
Attorney: Faryan Andrew Afifi Defendant’s response to amicus brief
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View Rights and Inverse Condemnation

(by Keith Turner, Esq. and Emma Samyan, Loyola Law School, J.D. Candidate | Class of 2018)

An ocean, mountain, city or other view can add a lot to a property’s value.  However, as “a general rule, a landowner has no natural right to air, light or an unobstructed view and the law is reluctant to imply such a right.”   The plaintiffs in the recent case of Boxer v. City of Beverly Hills (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1212 tried to use an inverse condemnation claim to sue the City of Beverly Hills for condemnation for planting thirty (30) Sequoia (Coastal) redwood trees in Roxbury Park.  The trees obstructed the homeowners long enjoyed view of the Hollywood Hills, , downtown Los Angeles, “and—on a clear day—Mounty Baldy 50 miles away.”  The court held that a view rights claim cannot be the basis of inverse condemnation claim.

What is inverse condemnation?

In a nutshell, “inverse condemnation” is based on the Constitutional right that provides that a property owner is entitled to compensation if the government takes its property.  The California Constitution specifically provides: “Private property may be taken or damaged for public use only when just compensation has first been paid to the owner.”  (Cal. Const. art. I, § 19; emphasis added.)  This constitutional principal provides for two types of claims:  [1] eminent domain (or condemnation), which is when the government sues a property owner to acquire property; and [2] inverse condemnation, which is when a property owner sues the government for taking or damaging its property  In either case the property owner is entitled to recover just compensation, which is often measured by the fair market value of the property taken.

The Boxer case

The plaintiffs in Boxer v. City of Beverly Hills were homeowners on Spalding Drive in Beverly Hills.  They sued the City of Beverly Hills for inverse condemnation, seeking damages and injunctive relief for the view obstruction as a result of coastal redwood trees that the City planted in Roxbury Park.  The plaintiffs specifically alleged that the trees blocked their “unobstructed view of the hills of Beverly Hills, the Hollywood Hills, and the Los Angeles basin, including the Hollywood sign, the Griffith Observatory, downtown Los Angeles, and—on a clear day—Mounty Baldy 50 miles away.”

The trial court sustained the plaintiffs’ demurrer, without leave to amend, which the court of appeal affirmed in the reported case.

The bottom line:  The court held that the plaintiffs could not sue the City for the view obstruction because “’[U]nder California law, a landowner has no right to an unobstructed view over adjoining property.’” Boxer v. City of Beverly Hills (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1212, 1219 (citing Posey v. Leavitt (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1236, 1250).  The general exceptions are view rights provided by local ordinances; CC&Rs or other deed obstructions; and in certain nuisance cases.  Id.

The plaintiffs in Boxer “vigorously” tried to save their claims by arguing that a property owner’s loss of view can be an element of compensable damages in eminent domain cases where there was a physical taking of the claimant’s property.  However, the court rejected that argument because there was no “physical invasion in a tangible manner,” which is the prerequisite for an inverse condemnation claim. The trees were planted on a neighboring property, not on any part of the plaintiffs’ property, nor did the plaintiffs complain “that the trees or debris from the trees physically intrude[d] upon the plaintiffs’ properties. (Id. at 1219). Plaintiffs are merely complaining of their obstructed view rights, which do not constitute physical damage to their properties. Thus, plaintiffs have not set any tangible physical intrusion on their properties.

Presumably, the plaintiffs-homeowners in Boxer have suffered a material loss in their value of their home from the loss of the views. The general common law rule of no view rights and the Boxer case is another reminder to home buyers (and their real estate brokers) to thoroughly research the property’s view rights if the view is an important part of the property’s value, before the sale closes.

tree pic

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Keith Turner co-author CEB’s California Easements and Boundaries: Law and Litigation book

The Continuing Education of the Bar (CEB) is a joint committee of The State Bar of California and the University of California that among other things publishes the leading legal treaties on California law topics.

Keith Turner is a co-author of two chapters in CEB’s California Easements and Boundaries: Law and Litigation book:

  • Boundary Easements and Neighboring Property Rights
  • Litigating Easement and Boundary Disputes

These chapters include some of the main laws and concepts involved in neighbor disputes, including encroachments, easements, party walls, view rights, trees/hedges, local zoning, etc., etc. etc.

 

CEB book.png

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View Rights and Inverse Condemnation

(by Keith Turner, Esq. and Emma Samyan, Loyola Law School, J.D. Candidate | Class of 2018)
The Turner Law Firm is one of the leading view rights law firms in California and has handled hundreds of view right cases.

An ocean, mountain, city or other view can add a lot to a property’s value.  However, as “a general rule, a landowner has no natural right to air, light or an unobstructed view and the law is reluctant to imply such a right.”   The plaintiffs in the recent case of Boxer v. City of Beverly Hills (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1212 tried to use an inverse condemnation claim to sue the City of Beverly Hills for condemnation for planting thirty (30) Sequoia (Coastal) redwood trees in Roxbury Park.  The trees obstructed the homeowners long enjoyed view of the Hollywood Hills, , downtown Los Angeles, “and—on a clear day—Mounty Baldy 50 miles away.”  The court held that a view rights claim cannot be the basis of inverse condemnation claim.

What is inverse condemnation?

In a nutshell, “inverse condemnation” is based on the Constitutional right that provides that a property owner is entitled to compensation if the government takes its property.  The California Constitution specifically provides: “Private property may be taken or damaged for public use only when just compensation has first been paid to the owner.”  (Cal. Const. art. I, § 19; emphasis added.)  This constitutional principal provides for two types of claims:  [1] eminent domain (or condemnation), which is when the government sues a property owner to acquire property; and [2] inverse condemnation, which is when a property owner sues the government for taking or damaging its property  In either case the property owner is entitled to recover just compensation, which is often measured by the fair market value of the property taken.

The Boxer case

The plaintiffs in Boxer v. City of Beverly Hills were homeowners on Spalding Drive in Beverly Hills.  They sued the City of Beverly Hills for inverse condemnation, seeking damages and injunctive relief for the view obstruction as a result of coastal redwood trees that the City planted in Roxbury Park.  The plaintiffs specifically alleged that the trees blocked their “unobstructed view of the hills of Beverly Hills, the Hollywood Hills, and the Los Angeles basin, including the Hollywood sign, the Griffith Observatory, downtown Los Angeles, and—on a clear day—Mounty Baldy 50 miles away.”

The trial court sustained the plaintiffs’ demurrer, without leave to amend, which the court of appeal affirmed in the reported case.

The bottom line:  The court held that the plaintiffs could not sue the City for the view obstruction because “’[U]nder California law, a landowner has no right to an unobstructed view over adjoining property.’” Boxer v. City of Beverly Hills (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1212, 1219 (citing Posey v. Leavitt (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1236, 1250).  The general exceptions are view rights provided by local ordinances; CC&Rs or other deed obstructions; and in certain nuisance cases.  Id.

The plaintiffs in Boxer “vigorously” tried to save their claims by arguing that a property owner’s loss of view can be an element of compensable damages in eminent domain cases where there was a physical taking of the claimant’s property.  However, the court rejected that argument because there was no “physical invasion in a tangible manner,” which is the prerequisite for an inverse condemnation claim. The trees were planted on a neighboring property, not on any part of the plaintiffs’ property, nor did the plaintiffs complain “that the trees or debris from the trees physically intrude[d] upon the plaintiffs’ properties. (Id. at 1219). Plaintiffs are merely complaining of their obstructed view rights, which do not constitute physical damage to their properties. Thus, plaintiffs have not set any tangible physical intrusion on their properties.

Presumably, the plaintiffs-homeowners in Boxer have suffered a material loss in their value of their home from the loss of the views. The general common law rule of no view rights and the Boxer case is another reminder to home buyers (and their real estate brokers) to thoroughly research the property’s view rights if the view is an important part of the property’s value, before the sale closes.

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