NEWS: 6/21/19 COURT OF APPEAL GUTTED VIEW RIGHTS PROVIDED BY THE MARQUEZ KNOLLS CC&Rs; Update regarding California Supreme Court review

UPDATE 2.9.23: Since the Court of Appeal’s decision in June 2019, there have been new cases interpreting the Court’s analysis. More information here: Post-Eisen Cases


UPDATE 9.12.19: The Supreme Court has denied the Petition for Review and Request for Depublication. More information on the Supreme Court case can be found on the Court of Appeal website.


UPDATE 8.10.19: The Eisen’s and Marquez Knolls Property Owners Association, Inc. are seeking to have the California Supreme Court grant review, which it does in less than 5% of the cases. Nonetheless, affected and interested property owners should support the fight with their own “amicus” letter to the Court” Marquez Knolls Property Owners Association 8/9/19 Amicus Letter


The Court of Appeal just gutted the Marquez Knolls CC&Rs.  Eisen v. Tavangarian – filed June 20, 2019, Second District, Div. Seven , full text click here.

Paragraph 11 of Marquez Knolls CC&Rs provides:

“No fences or hedges exceeding three feet in height shall be erected or permitted to remain between the street and the front set-back line nor shall any tree, shrub or other landscaping be planted or any structures erected that may at present or in the future obstruct the view from any other lot, and the right of entry is reserved by the Declarants to trim any tree obstructing the view of any lot.”

The Court of Appeal framed the issue as: “Does paragraph 11 of the CC&R’s … apply to alterations or renovations to existing homes?”

To summarize the 34 page decision, the Court specifically held: “Paragraph 11 does not restrict renovating or altering existing residences.” But the Court also held that the “Portion of the Judgment Requiring the Street-facing Hedges To Be Trimmed to a Height of Three Feet or Under Is Affirmed.”

So Paragraph 11 applies to trees but not additions or structures?

COMMENT: The decision does not make sense. If trees cannot obstruct a view, does it make sense that buildings can? Hundreds of homeowners have relied on Paragraph 11 ‘s clear intent to protect their views.

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8/1/19: Infamous Rustic Canyon house finally demolished after 17 years of litigation

In 1998, a property owner (Mehr Beglari) pulled permits for a remodel of an existing home in the Rustic Canyon area of Pacific Palisades. Five neighbors complained to the Los Angeles Department of Building and Safety (LADBS), alleging that the house exceeded a height of 36 feet from grade; the front yard depth was not properly measured; and that a yard variance granted in 1955 precluded the remodel design. The five neighbors included two Superior Court Judges and a prominant attorney. When the LADBS concluded that the Beglaris’ permits were properly issued, the neighbors appealed the case to the Department of City Planning, which sided with the LADBS.

The neighbors persevered. In 2002, they filed suit in Los Angeles Superior Court to challenge the ruling by the Department of City Planning. They dropped two of their complaints, targeting only on the front-yard setback issue. (click here to read the Complaint and other court documents.) In October 2003, the trial court ruled in favor of the neighbors, and ordered the City to revoke all of the building permits for the structure, including the certificate of occupancy. The Beglaries and the City of Los Angeles subsequently appealed.

The writ was affirmed by the court of appeal. Horwitz v. City of Angeles (2004) 124 Cal. App. 4th 1344. The court that then newly-remodeled house encroached onto the front-yard setback by 14 feet, in violation of Los Angeles Municipal Code section 12.07.01.C.1.

After the Court of Appeal decision, the City revoked all building permits and the certificate of occupancy for 909 Greentree, leaving the Belgaris with an un-permitted home. However, the Belgaris did not sit idly by; instead, they hatched a plan to get their permits back. In 2004, they purchased another property, right down the street, at 921 Greentree Road. Then, they obtained a permit for and constructed a small canopy on  the front of 921 Greentree. The new canopy changed the front-yard setback calculation for the entire block, including for their house at 909 Greentree.

Based on this altered front-yard setback calculation, the Belgaris’ home  at 909 Greentree satisfied the LAMC requirements. In February 2006, the City reinstated the building permits and certificate of occupancy for 909 Greentree.

The neighbors responded by filing another lawsuit, this time against the City of Los Angeles and the LADBS general manager, for reissuing the permits in violation of the court’s prior order. The superior court issued an order finding that the City and the Department of Building and Safety were in contempt for violation of that order, and ordered them to appear for appear at an arraignment and trial setting.

However, the case never got to trial. Instead, in February 2007, the City Council approved a $425,000 settlement for the five neighbor-plaintiffs.  The Belgaris’ attorney asked the City not to settle, accusing the neighbors of “intimidating and bullying the City” into paying into paying what amounts to blood money.” Nonetheless, due to the high potential damages exposure and potential criminal contempt proceedings, the City Attorney recommended that the City settle the dispute by paying the plaintiffs’ attorney fees, which at the time totaled $425,000.

The litigation between the City and Belgaris continued until 2013, with at least two more trips to the Court of Appeal in 2009 and 2013. Apparently the litigaiton ended in 2013.

According to public records, it appears that the Belgaris lost the home to foreclosure in 2016. In 2018, the new owner sought a demolition permit, and according to Nextdoor website, as of July 31, 2019, the structure was finally being demolised.

To the author, the question is whether the result would have been different if the complaining neighbors had directly sued the property based on Gov’t Code section 36900 instead of proceeding by writ action against the City?

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Horowitz/Belgari case documents

Below is a collection of documents from the infamous Horotiwz and Belgari cases which have resulted in the demolition of the residence at 909 Greentree Road in the Rustic Canyon area of Pacific Palisades.

2002 Complaint Horwitz vs. City of L.A. Download

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(THIS POST HAS BEE UPDATED.) Marquez Knolls’ view rights under attack again (Eisen vs. Tavangarian)

THIS POST HAS BEEN UPDATED IN LIGHT OF THE 6/20/19 COURT OF APPEAL DECISON.  CLICK HERE

Marquez Knolls’ view rights under attack again (Eisen vs. Tavangarian)

Since the 1950s, property owners in the Marquez Knolls tracts in Pacific Palisades have relied on the recorded CC&Rs to protect their views.  Although the original architectural committee’s powers expired on December 31, 1995, many property owners believed that their view rights continued by CC&Rs Paragraph 11, which did not have a termination date, and which provides:

“No fences or hedges exceeding three feet in height shall be erected or permitted to remain between the street and the front set-back line nor shall any tree, shrub or other landscaping be planted or any structures erected that may at present or in the future unreasonably obstruct the view from any other lot, and the right of entry is reserved by the Declarants to trim any tree obstructing the view of any lot.”

(The word “unreasonably” was added to ¶11 by the Court of Appeal in its 2005 decision in Zabrucky v. McAdams (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 618.)

For the reasons discussed below, it could now be the perfect storm to reverse or materially change the view rights that were provided in Zabrucky.

There is a case currently on appeal that is seeking to reverse or limit the view rights the court affirmed in the 2005 Zabrucky case.  The current case is Eisen vs. Tavangarian  (See opening brief served on Sept. 25, 2017.)   Concerned Marquez Knolls’ property owners can voice their concern by submitting an amicus brief by the court deadline.  (Contact us for information on the deadline.)

The plaintiffs in Eisen sued a well known local developer for obstructing their view.  The trial judge found in favor of the plaintiffs and ordered the defendant to remove a portion of the new “spec” house he had constructed.   The defendant is presently appealing the judgment against him, and in his opening appellate brief is seeking to the view rights it affirmed in the Zabrucky case

The plaintiffs in Zabrucky had actually argued that ¶11 precluded any obstruction of their ocean view.  The Court of Appeal in that case was apparently aware that its decision would have a significant impact on the ability to remodel the original aging homes in Marquez Knolls.  The court tried to find a balance, while acknowledging the CC&Rs’ intent to provide view rights.  As the court stated at pages 623-624:

“In common with most coastline housing in Southern California, the prime thing the Marquez Knolls development sold its prospective homeowners was a beautiful ocean view. In fact, like most such housing, much of the value of any property within the development depends on the quality of the view. To significantly obstruct any homeowner’s view of the Pacific Ocean is to depreciate the economic worth of their property-often by several hundred thousand dollars – as well as dramatically reduce their enjoyment of the home they bought and live in. Thus, it is not surprising the rest of the Zabruckys’ neighbors, the MKPOA, filed an amicus brief seeking to enforce the development’s CC&Rs. These provisions, and especially the Paragraph 11 at issue in this case, form their only bulwark against rampant expansions of existing residences that would obstruct views and depreciate land values throughout the entire Marquez Knolls neighborhood.”

The plaintiffs argued that ¶11 prohibited any obstruction.  But the court of appeal in the published decision rejected that argument and instead added the word “unreasonably” to ¶11”.  At page 629 the Court stated:

“However, it is not reasonable to interpret the CC&Rs as prohibiting any obstruction of existing views as urged by appellants. We agree with the trial court’s observation that it would have been impractical for the original drafters of the CC&Rs to have intended that no house be built which obstructed any other owner’s view. Thus, we conclude it would be in keeping with the intent of the drafters of the CC&Rs to read into Paragraph 11 a provision that the view may not be unreasonably obstructed, thus the sentence would read, “may at present or in the future unreasonably obstruct the view from any other lot.” (Change underlined.)”

Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, on re-trial, the trial court judge inspected the properties and decided that defendants’ remodeling project was not an unreasonable obstruction.  (See then Judge John L. Segal’s Statement of Decision 3-1-2006.)

Since 2005, there have been a number of lawsuits filed challenging new construction and remodeling projects and also landscaping on the grounds that the construction or landscaping was or would be an unreasonable obstruction.  (See partial list of case here.)  The many of those cases went to trial and were decided by a judge, not a jury, and it seems the result depended on the particular’s judge’s interpretation of what constitutes to be “unreasonable obstruction.”

The trial judge for the Zabrucky re-trial is now one of the three appellate justices that is deciding the Eisen appeal.  In Zabrucky and supposedly in the other Marquez Knolls cases he decided as a trial court judge, Judge (now Justice) Segal did not find for any plaintiff seeking to enforce ¶11.

But the main concern now is that the Presiding Justice for the Eisen appeal, Justice Dennis M. Perluss, wrote the dissenting opinion in Zabrucky.  In Zabrucky, Justice Perluss disagreed with the majority’s interpretation of paragraph 11, explaining that its “plain language . . . particularly when considered together with other provisions in the CC&R’s,” did not support the majority’s conclusion. (Zabrucky, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 630 (dis. opn. of Perluss, J.).)

“Apparently uncomfortable with the harsh consequences of their restrictive reading of the view protection clause, my colleagues adopt the suggestion advanced by amicus curiae Marquez Knolls Property Owners Association (but notably not endorsed by the Zabruckys) and create a reasonableness limitation on the absolute prohibition of view obstruction contained in paragraph 11. This effort to mitigate the impact of their decision for homeowners like McAdams and Baines who may wish to renovate homes that are now 40 years old is in many respects commendable, but it constitutes an impermissible rewriting of the express terms of the CC & R’s.”

“The majority’s legitimate concern that paragraph 11 may be applied unreasonably suggests to me it has misinterpreted that provision. Its apprehension, however, is not a justification for a judicial rewriting of the parties’ agreement.”

But more problematic is that Judge Perluss’s dissent in Zabrucky went further by concluding that ¶11 should not even apply to structures:

“Although in other contexts the word ‘structure’ may include the residence itself, given the apparent object of paragraph 11, particularly when read together with paragraph 2, ‘structures’ in this paragraph is properly limited to landscaping or other outdoor items separated from the residence itself—gazebos, trellises, carriage or pool houses.”

The Appellant (Ardie Tavangarian) in Eisen is arguing among other things that “Paragraph 11 applies only to landscaping structures and therefore does not restrict alterations to a residence.“  (Opening Brief, p. 35)  With Justices Perluss and Segal as the appellate justices, it seems from the sidelines that the view rights that many have taken for granted in Marquez Knolls could be eliminated or severely limited by the Court’s decision in Eisen.  

NEWS:   The case was fully briefed as of September 10, 2018, but a group of homeowners, led by the usual suspects, Judith A. Gelfand and Wayne Marcus, sought and obtained permission to file an amicus brief (friends of the court).  The editor of this blog has asked for copies of those briefs.  At this point we assume the the oral argument will be scheduled for late winter or so.  

To get updates about the case directly from the Court of Appeal, CLICK HERE and enter the COA case number: B278271.

10/12/2018 Amicus curiae brief filed by: Amicus curiae for appellant: Marquez Knolls Homeowners et al.
Attorney: Judith A. Gelfand Marquez Knolls Homeowners Judith A. Gelfand, Wayne Marcus, Bernard Hathaway, William R. Fado, H. Peter Grassl, Kathleen A. Kerrigan, Silgia Grassl, Emil Kadrnka, Simon T. Halff, Brian Faris, Peter J. Zomber, Sabrina Diaz and Renate Hecht in support of plaintiffs Glenn Eisen and Alison Eisen.
11/01/2018 Response to amicus curiae brief filed by: Defendant and Appellant: Ardeshir Tavangarian
Attorney: Faryan Andrew Afifi 
Defendant and Appellant: Tania Tavangarian
Attorney: Faryan Andrew Afifi 
Defendant and Appellant: 619 Properties, LLC
Attorney: Faryan Andrew Afifi Defendant’s response to amicus brief
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View Rights and Inverse Condemnation

(by Keith Turner, Esq. and Emma Samyan, Loyola Law School, J.D. Candidate | Class of 2018)

An ocean, mountain, city or other view can add a lot to a property’s value.  However, as “a general rule, a landowner has no natural right to air, light or an unobstructed view and the law is reluctant to imply such a right.”   The plaintiffs in the recent case of Boxer v. City of Beverly Hills (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1212 tried to use an inverse condemnation claim to sue the City of Beverly Hills for condemnation for planting thirty (30) Sequoia (Coastal) redwood trees in Roxbury Park.  The trees obstructed the homeowners long enjoyed view of the Hollywood Hills, , downtown Los Angeles, “and—on a clear day—Mounty Baldy 50 miles away.”  The court held that a view rights claim cannot be the basis of inverse condemnation claim.

What is inverse condemnation?

In a nutshell, “inverse condemnation” is based on the Constitutional right that provides that a property owner is entitled to compensation if the government takes its property.  The California Constitution specifically provides: “Private property may be taken or damaged for public use only when just compensation has first been paid to the owner.”  (Cal. Const. art. I, § 19; emphasis added.)  This constitutional principal provides for two types of claims:  [1] eminent domain (or condemnation), which is when the government sues a property owner to acquire property; and [2] inverse condemnation, which is when a property owner sues the government for taking or damaging its property  In either case the property owner is entitled to recover just compensation, which is often measured by the fair market value of the property taken.

The Boxer case

The plaintiffs in Boxer v. City of Beverly Hills were homeowners on Spalding Drive in Beverly Hills.  They sued the City of Beverly Hills for inverse condemnation, seeking damages and injunctive relief for the view obstruction as a result of coastal redwood trees that the City planted in Roxbury Park.  The plaintiffs specifically alleged that the trees blocked their “unobstructed view of the hills of Beverly Hills, the Hollywood Hills, and the Los Angeles basin, including the Hollywood sign, the Griffith Observatory, downtown Los Angeles, and—on a clear day—Mounty Baldy 50 miles away.”

The trial court sustained the plaintiffs’ demurrer, without leave to amend, which the court of appeal affirmed in the reported case.

The bottom line:  The court held that the plaintiffs could not sue the City for the view obstruction because “’[U]nder California law, a landowner has no right to an unobstructed view over adjoining property.’” Boxer v. City of Beverly Hills (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1212, 1219 (citing Posey v. Leavitt (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1236, 1250).  The general exceptions are view rights provided by local ordinances; CC&Rs or other deed obstructions; and in certain nuisance cases.  Id.

The plaintiffs in Boxer “vigorously” tried to save their claims by arguing that a property owner’s loss of view can be an element of compensable damages in eminent domain cases where there was a physical taking of the claimant’s property.  However, the court rejected that argument because there was no “physical invasion in a tangible manner,” which is the prerequisite for an inverse condemnation claim. The trees were planted on a neighboring property, not on any part of the plaintiffs’ property, nor did the plaintiffs complain “that the trees or debris from the trees physically intrude[d] upon the plaintiffs’ properties. (Id. at 1219). Plaintiffs are merely complaining of their obstructed view rights, which do not constitute physical damage to their properties. Thus, plaintiffs have not set any tangible physical intrusion on their properties.

Presumably, the plaintiffs-homeowners in Boxer have suffered a material loss in their value of their home from the loss of the views. The general common law rule of no view rights and the Boxer case is another reminder to home buyers (and their real estate brokers) to thoroughly research the property’s view rights if the view is an important part of the property’s value, before the sale closes.

tree pic

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Keith Turner co-author CEB’s California Easements and Boundaries: Law and Litigation book

The Continuing Education of the Bar (CEB) is a joint committee of The State Bar of California and the University of California that among other things publishes the leading legal treaties on California law topics.

Keith Turner is a co-author of two chapters in CEB’s California Easements and Boundaries: Law and Litigation book:

  • Boundary Easements and Neighboring Property Rights
  • Litigating Easement and Boundary Disputes

These chapters include some of the main laws and concepts involved in neighbor disputes, including encroachments, easements, party walls, view rights, trees/hedges, local zoning, etc., etc. etc.

 

CEB book.png

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View Rights and Inverse Condemnation

(by Keith Turner, Esq. and Emma Samyan, Loyola Law School, J.D. Candidate | Class of 2018)
The Turner Law Firm is one of the leading view rights law firms in California and has handled hundreds of view right cases.

An ocean, mountain, city or other view can add a lot to a property’s value.  However, as “a general rule, a landowner has no natural right to air, light or an unobstructed view and the law is reluctant to imply such a right.”   The plaintiffs in the recent case of Boxer v. City of Beverly Hills (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1212 tried to use an inverse condemnation claim to sue the City of Beverly Hills for condemnation for planting thirty (30) Sequoia (Coastal) redwood trees in Roxbury Park.  The trees obstructed the homeowners long enjoyed view of the Hollywood Hills, , downtown Los Angeles, “and—on a clear day—Mounty Baldy 50 miles away.”  The court held that a view rights claim cannot be the basis of inverse condemnation claim.

What is inverse condemnation?

In a nutshell, “inverse condemnation” is based on the Constitutional right that provides that a property owner is entitled to compensation if the government takes its property.  The California Constitution specifically provides: “Private property may be taken or damaged for public use only when just compensation has first been paid to the owner.”  (Cal. Const. art. I, § 19; emphasis added.)  This constitutional principal provides for two types of claims:  [1] eminent domain (or condemnation), which is when the government sues a property owner to acquire property; and [2] inverse condemnation, which is when a property owner sues the government for taking or damaging its property  In either case the property owner is entitled to recover just compensation, which is often measured by the fair market value of the property taken.

The Boxer case

The plaintiffs in Boxer v. City of Beverly Hills were homeowners on Spalding Drive in Beverly Hills.  They sued the City of Beverly Hills for inverse condemnation, seeking damages and injunctive relief for the view obstruction as a result of coastal redwood trees that the City planted in Roxbury Park.  The plaintiffs specifically alleged that the trees blocked their “unobstructed view of the hills of Beverly Hills, the Hollywood Hills, and the Los Angeles basin, including the Hollywood sign, the Griffith Observatory, downtown Los Angeles, and—on a clear day—Mounty Baldy 50 miles away.”

The trial court sustained the plaintiffs’ demurrer, without leave to amend, which the court of appeal affirmed in the reported case.

The bottom line:  The court held that the plaintiffs could not sue the City for the view obstruction because “’[U]nder California law, a landowner has no right to an unobstructed view over adjoining property.’” Boxer v. City of Beverly Hills (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1212, 1219 (citing Posey v. Leavitt (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1236, 1250).  The general exceptions are view rights provided by local ordinances; CC&Rs or other deed obstructions; and in certain nuisance cases.  Id.

The plaintiffs in Boxer “vigorously” tried to save their claims by arguing that a property owner’s loss of view can be an element of compensable damages in eminent domain cases where there was a physical taking of the claimant’s property.  However, the court rejected that argument because there was no “physical invasion in a tangible manner,” which is the prerequisite for an inverse condemnation claim. The trees were planted on a neighboring property, not on any part of the plaintiffs’ property, nor did the plaintiffs complain “that the trees or debris from the trees physically intrude[d] upon the plaintiffs’ properties. (Id. at 1219). Plaintiffs are merely complaining of their obstructed view rights, which do not constitute physical damage to their properties. Thus, plaintiffs have not set any tangible physical intrusion on their properties.

Presumably, the plaintiffs-homeowners in Boxer have suffered a material loss in their value of their home from the loss of the views. The general common law rule of no view rights and the Boxer case is another reminder to home buyers (and their real estate brokers) to thoroughly research the property’s view rights if the view is an important part of the property’s value, before the sale closes.

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View Rights in the Hollywood Hills (Rising Glen Road and the Beverly Highlands Homes Association)

One of the key features of property in the Hollywood Hills are the incredible city and ocean views enjoyed from most of the lots.  However, many property owners learn after closing that their views are not fully protected.  The time to research a property’s view rights is before closing!

Rising Glenn Road in the Hollywood Hills is one of the areas that provides property owners with express view rights.  The Turner Law Firm has successfully handled a number of view rights and neighbor disputes for property owners there.  Many of these matters have involved developers and/or their attorneys who apparently either misread or ignored the CC&Rs.

Rising Glenn Road and portions of the connecting streets north of Sunset Plaza were developed as the “Beverly Highlands Homes Association.”  The 1952 recorded Declarations of Restrictions (a/k/a CC&Rs) provide view rights by expressly limiting the height of homes and structures to 15′ or 16′ depending on the specific lot.

Beverly Highlands CC&Rs

The properties subject to the Beverly Highlands Homes Association CC&Rs include the lots in these recorded maps:  Tract 17290, 19543, 19229 (and possibly three other Tracts that we are researching with the title company.)

The CC&Rs provided that building plans were to be reviewed by the Association, but the Association was suspended as a corporation on April 2, 1972.  A group attempted to revive the Association in 1989, but in 1999, its Board voted to dissolve it.    In response, a separate group of homeowners called “Committee to Save the Beverly Highlands Homes Association” filed a lawsuit against the Board to enjoin the dissolution, Committee to Save the Beverly Highlands Homes Assn. v. Beverly Highlands Homes Assn. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1247.  In a nutshell, the court rejected the Committee’s attempt to save the Association.

The court did state in dicta that even if the Association is dissolved, the property owners still can enforce the CC&Rs: “Article XVI of the Declaration gives the individual Beverly Highlands property owners the right to enforce the Declaration.”  That provision states: “The provisions contained in the Declaration shall bind and inure to the benefit of and be enforceable by Declarant, the Association, or the owner or owners of any portion of said property, or their and each of their legal representatives, heirs, successors and assignees, and failure by Declarant, or by the Association, or by any other property owner, or their legal representatives, heirs, successors or assigns, to enforce any of such conditions, restrictions or charges herein contained shall in no event be deemed as a waiver of the right to do so hereafter.”

California law generally provides that CC&Rs can be directly enforced by individual property owners in the tract, unless the CC&Rs states otherwise.  (See, Civil Code §5975, but that statute applies to CC&Rs for common interest developments that are subject to the Davis Striling Act.   Many developments or tracts, particularly in the Hollywood Hills area and the Santa Monica Mountains, from Hollywood to Pacific Palisades, are not common interest developments, and thus not subject to the Davis Striling Act.  The court in Committee to Save the Beverly Highlands Homes Assn.  held that it was not common interest development:  “Accordingly, we must conclude that the Beverly Highlands has no common area within the meaning of Civil Code section 1351, subdivision (b). Therefore, the Davis-Stirling Act does not apply to it.”  Id., at 1271.  The court has similarly held that the Mount Olympus tract and Cloverdale, Terraza, Stillwater, Weatherford Homeowners Association in Baldwin Hills are not common interest developments.  See, Mount Olympus Property Owners Assn. v. Shpirt (1997)  59 Cal.App.4th 885; Tract 19051 Homeowners Ass’n v. Kemp (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1135.)

If you live on or near Rising Glenn or are considering building there, the property may be subject to specific view rights and building limits that are still enforceable even though the Association was dissloved long ago.   Like most real estate law issues, it best to consult with an experienced attorney before making any major development or land use decisions.

(The Turner Law Firm is one of the leading view rights law firms in California.  It has handled hundreds of view rights cases and many more neighbor and land use disputes.)

 

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Anti-SLAPP and HOA Disputes

Colyear v. Rolling Hills Community Association of Rancho Palos Verdes (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 119 is a recent example of an anti-SLAPP motion being a very powerful defense weapon in HOA litigation.

The term “SLAPP” means “Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation,” which includes a lawsuit based on conduct in furtherance of the exercise of free speech regarding an issue of “public interest.”  (Code of Civil Procedure §425.16.)   California law provides that a defendant can seek to immediately strike such a lawsuit and if the defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion is granted, the statute provides that the prevailing defendants is entitled to its attorney’s fees and costs incurred in bringing the motion.  A SLAPP lawsuits are considered to be “generally meritless suits brought primarily to chill the exercise of free speech or petition rights by the threat of severe economic sanctions against the defendant, and not to vindicate a legally cognizable right.”

Colyear and other cases provide chilling examples of how the anti-SLAPP motion procedure has been used to squash homeowners seeking judicial relief from allegedly out of control HOA boards of directors or disputes with other homeowners (members).

Facts

Colyear arises from homeowner defendant Yu Ping Liu’s “Application for Assistance to Restore View” that he with the HOA, because the view from his residence was obstructed by several trees and hedges.   The CC&Rs provided that the HOA had “the right at any time to enter on or upon any part” of a property subject to that declaration “for the purpose of cutting back trees or other plantings which, in the opinion of the [HOA], is warranted to maintain and improve the view of, and protect, adjoining property.”  Liu believed that the trees in question  were on the property immediately north of Liu’s property, which was owned by Richard and Kathleen Krauthamer.  However, plaintiff Richard Colyear alleged that the trees were in fact on his property, which was directly east of the Krauthamer’s property, and kitty-corner to Liu’s property.  Liu, Colyear, and the Krauthamers are all members of the HOA.

Two months after the Application was filed, Colyear filed a lawsuit against Liu and the HOA Board.  Colyear alleged that two of the offending trees were actually on his property, that the relevant tree-trimming CC&R provision covenant did not encumber his property, and therefore that Liu and the HOA were wrongfully clouding his title.

One month after being sued, Liu withdrew his Application.  As a result, the HOA never issued any decision on the Application. Following the withdrawal, the HOA had no pending applications involving either Liu or Colyear’s property.

Colyear’s operative verified complaint “for Declaratory Relief, Injunctive Relief, To Quiet Title, and for Damages” sought a declaration, among other things, that Colyear’s lot was not subject to the tree-trimming CC&R provision; and that a specific HOA Board’s Resolution was void to the extent it purported to enforce such tree-trimming covenant.   The complaint sought to quiet title to Colyear’s lot that it was not covered by the trees tree-trimming CC&R provision.  Finally, the complaint sought injunctive relief barring defendants from seeking to enforce the relevant covenant against Colyear’s lot.  The plaintiff also claimed compensatory and punitive damages from the HOA and the board for alleged fraud and breaches of fiduciary duties.

Liu filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike Colyear’s complaint, which the trial court granted and court of appeal affirmed.

Decision

The main issue in the report court of appeal decision was whether Colyear’s claim arose from “protected activity.”  The anti-SLAPP motion procedure applies to a lawsuit based on a statement made in connection with “an issue of public interest.”  (Code of Civil Procedure §425.16(e)(4).)

California caselaw holds that “‘public interest’ within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute has been broadly defined to include, in addition to government matters,  ‘“private conduct that impacts a broad segment of society and/or that affects a community in a manner similar to that of a governmental entity.” ’ Thus, “several courts have found protected conduct in the context of disputes within a homeowners association.”  Colyear, suppra, at 131; see e.g., Ruiz v. Harbor View Community Assn. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1456, 1468, Country Side Villas Homeowners Assn. v. Ivie (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1113; Damon v. Ocean Hills Journalism Club (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 468, 479; Lee v. Silveira (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 527, 540; Talega Maintenance Corporation v. Standard Pacific Corporation (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 722, 729.

The court rejected Colyear argument that Liu’s application was just a private tree-trimming dispute between two neighbors and therefore does not qualify as a matter of “public interest.”  The court rejected that the argument because Liu’ application evidenced that there was an ongoing controversy, dispute, or discussion regarding the applicability of tree-trimming C&R provision and the HOA’s authority to enforce it.  Furthermore, the issue was an ongoing topic of debate between the board and homeowners, resulting in multiple hearings, letters, and several changes to the board’s policy on the matter starting as early as 2002 and continuing up to the current dispute. In this context, Liu’s application sought to invoke the HOA process at the center of that dispute.

(The reported decision further discussed: Claim Arises From Protected Activity; and Colyear Cannot Demonstrate a Probability of Prevailing Against Liu.)

 

On the one hand, the case seems to be chilling use of the anti-SLAPP procedure to preclude the right to resolve a CC&R/HOA related disputed by litigation.   We can appreciate plaintiff Colyear’s desire to obtain judicial relief for the ongoing dispute regarding the CC&R’s tree trimming provision and the HOA’s right or power to enforce it.    But obviously the case would have had a different outcome if Colyear would have pursued the HOA’s “dispute resolution process.”   California’s HOA laws (the Davis-Stirling Act) contain several sections that sometimes require the use of the dispute resolution process before litigation can be filed.  Civil Code section 5905 requires that associations provide a “fair, reasonable, and expeditious procedure for resolving a dispute” with members.

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HOA Board of Directors have a duty to act with reasonable diligence in the performance of director duties.

By Keith Turner and Justin Escano

 

Palm Spings Villas II v. Parth is a another example of what can happen when an HOA board member “goes rogue” and tests the limits of the so-called “business judgment rule,” which HOA board members sometimes naively believe  immunizes their conduct from personal liability.  The court held that an HOA director can be held personally liable for failing to act with reasonable diligence in the performance of director duties.

This case is important reminder that HOA board members’ authority is also limited by the governing documents, the CC&Rs and by-laws.

In this case, the HOA itself sued Erna Parth, the HOA president and a member of the board of directors, for a number of questionable actions she took on behalf of the HOA:

Parth hired a roofing company to perform roofing repairs, without notice or approval by the Board, after the Board had already approved and hired a different roofing company for the same repairs.  She did not confirm whether the company held a roofing license.

Parth signed three promissory notes totaling $1.775 million, secured by HOA assets and property, for a project to repave walkways and other repairs. She did not give notice or obtain approval by the board for obtaining the loans; and she did not review the CC&Rs or Bylaws to determine whether she had authority to execute the promissory notes; but she believed she had the authority to do so. Under the governing documents, a vote of the majority of the members was required to use HOA assets as security for the loans; however, she did not know such a vote was required

Parth hired landscaping  company to a 5-year contract; however, under the Bylaws, a majority vote of the members was required to enter into a services contract for longer than a year. She also hired a new management company, even though the existing company had not yet been terminated by the Board, and the Board agreed not to terminate the company until they received bids from other management companies.

Finally, Parth secretly renewed a 1-year contract with their existing security company, even though the Board was actively obtaining bids from other security companies. She did not disclose the 1-year renewal with the new company. When the HOA Board hired a different security company, the existing company sued for breach of contract, which led to the HOA’s cross-complaint against Parth.

At deposition, Perth repeatedly admitted that she had no understanding of what her actual scope of authority was as the HOA President and a board member, and that she never reviewed the governing documents to find out.

Parth’s main defense from personal liability was the  business judgment rule. Although the business judgment rule applies generally to all corporations, the California Corporations Code has special sections for volunteer directors of nonprofit organizations. At issue in Palm Springs Villas II, was the section governing volunteer directors and officers of mutual benefit corporations, Corp. Code § 7231.5.  Under the business judgment rule, an HOA director will not be held personally liable in  the performance of their duties. Even if a director breaks HOA rules, or otherwise makes unsound business decisions, that director will not be personally liable as long as they acted in good faith, in the best interests of the HOA, and based on reasonable inquiry. The business judgment rule is intended to allow board members to make important decisions, including those that may pose some risk to the HOA; without it, directors would be paralyzed by the fear of being held personally liable for acting on behalf of the HOA.

However, the business judgment rule has its limits. It will not protect a director who fails to exercise reasonable diligence, fails to conduct a reasonable investigation, or otherwise acts in bad faith in the performance of director duties.

In Palm Springs Villas II, the court of appeal held that the business judgment rule did not automatically shield Perth from liability, because there were material issues of fact as to whether Perth exercised reasonable diligence and conducted reasonable investigations in the performance of her duties. Parth repeatedly stated at deposition that, before she engaged in these activities, she did not know whether she had the authority to do so. Further, she did not make any efforts to review the governing documents to determine whether her actions needed approval by the Board or by the shareholders. Finally, Parth failed to conduct reasonable investigations and basic inquiries, such as whether the roofing company she hired had a roofing license. According to the court, these failures to investigate amounted to “willful ignorance,” and created an issue of material fact as to whether Parth acted with reasonable diligence. The court even suggested that Parth’s failures could amount to bad faith conduct. As explained by the court, “Permitting directors to remain ignorant and to rely on their uninformed beliefs to obtain summary judgment would gut the reasonable diligence element of the rule and, quite possibly, incentivize directors to remain ignorant.”

Palm Springs Villas II is a good reminder to HOA directors that they have a duty to act exercise diligence when attending to the property’s needs. HOA directors cannot simply hide behind the business judgment rule. The case is good example for disgruntled unit owners to challenge the ineptitude and incompetence of HOA directors, and to remind them to do their duty.

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